Artist's Rights and Lady and the Tramp

LITIGATION

In the case of Lee v. Disney we considered two separate legal issues: breach of contract and invasion of privacy. To determine whether breach of contract has occurred we looked to the terms of the contract to establish the parties’ obligations and applied general legal practices which the court will use to make a judgment in this case.

The court will apply the plain meaning rule to interpret the contract between Disney and Ms. Lee. This means that the terms must be determined from the face of the instrument, the written document, alone. Generally, if a contract’s words appear to be clear and unambiguous the court will not consider any evidence not contained in the document itself. As in this case, there may be issues which are not mentioned or are ambiguously addressed in the contract. In order for courts to address ambiguity in contracts they must look at the intent of the parties at the time the contract was created. However, courts do not consider the fairness of the terms and simply look to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the parties by interpreting intent. “A contract extends only to those things concerning which it appears the parties intended to contract.”

In this case we found specific contractual language that speaks to Disney’s defense. Per the contract, Disney owns the right to distribute the movie to theatres and broadcasting companies in domestic and foreign markets. The contract also gives Disney the rights to distribute the film through “any other technology yet to be invented.” Disney will look to this clause to prove the right to distribute the film through videocassettes, which were introduced more than two decades after the formation of the contract.

Disney’s evidence regarding their practice not to allow profit sharing deals for voice performers in animated movies will most likely not be considered by the court. We believe this to be the case because contractual meaning is determined by the objective manifestations of the parties' intent under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract. The two pieces of evidence introduced by Disney date to 1989 and 1988, which offers no insight to the contractual intent of Disney at the time Peggy Lee's agreement with Disney was negotiated and signed (1952). Although Disney points to experiences dating to the 1920s, no factual evidence predating the contract is introduced. Therefore, Disney cannot prove their intent on the basis of custom or business practices.

If Disney comes out victorious in this lawsuit, the company would be free of any residual payments for the use of Peggy Lee’s voice and songs. There is no countersuit on this matter. However, there is a counter-offer. The counter offer of $381,000 (a figure pre-determined and capped by the union) is applicable only if Peggy Lee agrees to settle for this amount. Without a settlement, Ms. Lee is not entitled to any payments for the sale of the videocassettes. Peggy Pee will retain rights to residual payments at 12.5% for such items as phonographic recordings to the public.

Paragraph 12 (b) of the contract provides a strong backing to Ms. Lee’s case. The paragraph states that disregarding all other provisions of the contract, Disney does not have the right to make phonographic recordings and / or transcriptions, which contain Ms. Lee’s services, for sale to the public. There are several key words in the paragraph. First, the word transcription covers recordings belonging to the same type of media as a videocassette. Merriam- Webster Dictionary defines the word as, “an arrangement of a musical composition for some instrument or voice other than the original.” Second, there is a clear distinction in the language of the contract between the target client of Disney, for which all rights were obtained, and the target client of Ms. Lee, for which she retained rights to residual payments. Disney obtained rights to sell to companies, whereas Peggy Lee retained rights to sell to the public. At the time of the audience the only available medium for sale to the public was a phonograph recording. The intent of Ms. Lee was to allow such sale only for a profit sharing compensation of 12.5%. The California Civil Code Paragraph 1648 states that, “However broad may be the terms of a contract, it extends only to those things concerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract.” Ms. Lee’s intent is demonstrated by the language of the contract.

The second legal issue we analyzed in this case is invasion of privacy. A number of federal and state statues have been enacted to protect individual privacy rights in specific areas. Four types of tort laws safeguard these rights:

1. Intrusion on privacy or solitude