Western and African Communitarianism

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Every human society has the outstanding characteristic of a social structure. This social structure is one founded on the evolving nature of human society and is thus consequential to certain conceptions of human nature. It also provides the necessary framework for the realisation of individual goals, potentials and hopes as well as for the continuity and survival of the society. This paper attempts to break up the notion of a social structure giving particular focus to the concept of communitarianism. With this in mind, it will attempt to identify the trend of communitarianism within western philosophy. However, it could be argued that this concept of communitarianism is more authentically African than Western. This will be proved to be true through an analysis of the concept of personhood from both the western and African perspectives with emphasis on the inherent communal orientation of both perspectives and a conclusive discussion as to why the concept of communitarianism is authentically more African than western.

The definition of personhood in western and African philosophy is one that comes with great contention with regard to the outstanding characteristics inherent within defining personhood. The following paragraphs will provide a comparison between the western and African conceptions of personhood.

Looking firstly at the Western interpretation of personhood, Emmanuel Kant will be used as the first point of departure as to what defines a human person. The Kantian perspective of personhood describes a person as a rational and self-determining being. He views action undertaken by a person as a result of duty dictated by reason. Furthermore, his reasoning is based on his inherent belief that reason has authority for morality. He identifies ‘the categorical imperative’ as one of the commands brought about by reason. This categorical imperative is one that orders a course of action due to its rightness and necessity, as Kant expresses it: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a general natural law” (Chrysostome, 2008). Kant also prioritises the fundamental freedom and autonomy of the individual. This freedom is one that emphasises self-determination and the freedom to consciously conform and follow any seemingly universal laws as revealed by reason. The Kantian perspective asserts that reason breeds morality and this presupposes that freedom equips a rational person with the tools of knowing what to do and using his individual autonomy to act accordingly. The categorical imperative put forward by Kant also conceives of the person as endowed with will. This is an inherent characteristic of a rational being and allows the power of self-determination in accordance with conformity to certain laws. Additionally, the objective basis for will to determine itself as an end is proclaimed by Kant as a reason that is presumably equally acceptable and applicable to all rational persons. On that note we could assume that a person’s relation to others is anchored on the principle of equality.

Thomas Hobbes, an English philosopher puts forward a more collectivised and centralised conception of personhood in his Leviathan. First and foremost, it is important to take note that the main idea within Leviathan is Hobbes’ deliberation on the human person in relation to the commonwealth or the state. The commonwealth constitutes an overarching political body that takes the form of a government which is granted various powers that enable it to get members (people) to execute their duties. Hobbes’ initial argument is that men enter into a ‘Social Contract’ which requires the submission of power and freedom to the supreme authority of the state on the basis of receiving protection (Chrysostome, 2008). He identifies the first law of nature as one that compels humans to seek peace and to this end the social contract is necessary (SparkNote Editors, 2005). Hobbes writes: “Though created with boundless liberty, every person is irrebuttably presumed to make the same choice; that is, he consents to the rules ordained by the common sovereign. By social contract each of us promptly surrenders his freedom in exchange for security”.