Casullo's Fourth Version of the Bundle Theory

The bundle theory states that any thing is simply a complex of properties which all stand in a contingent relation, called co-instantiation, to one another. Basically an object is nothing more than a collection of its properties. The bundle theory is an alternative to other theories of particulars such as the substratum theory and the substance theory of particulars. James Van Cleve proposes a few objections that he considers to be severely damaging to the bundle theory. In Casullo’s “Fourth Version of the Bundle Theory,” he attempts to get around the objections that Van Cleve poses to the bundle theory.

Van Cleve has a few main objections to the bundle theory, the three most important being the problem of change, the problem of contingency, and the fact that the bundle theory relies on the identity of indiscernibles. The problem of change states that since an object is just a set of properties, if one property changes, so too does the object. The problem of identity across time is important because the very nature of change is such that it consists of the same individual undergoing a change, rather than a new individual being created whenever a property is added, subtracted, or changed. The problem of contingency is related to the problem of change. As soon as any property changes, the identity of the object changes, and thus every property is treated as essential. Van Cleve also points out that the bundle theory requires the identity of indiscernibles as a truth, which is often questioned. Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles states that if two objects have exactly the same properties, then they must be the same object. This is particularly controversial because it entails there can be no two individuals that are exactly alike.

In Casullo’s “A Fourth Version of the Bundle Theory,” each one of these objections is taken on one at a time and a new version of the bundle theory is created. In order to evaluate the problem of change and the problem of contingency, two more problems come into light: the problem of individuation and the problem of identity across time. The problem of individuation relates to how to pick out a single individual not only from members of a different but members of its own kind. According to Casullo, a theory of individuation is a theory of how to distinguish individuals within the same kind to which they belong. The problem of identity across time is essentially the problem of change and deals with the changes an individual can and cannot survive. Casullo proposes what he calls a “bundle-bundle” theory. Casullo attempts to solve both the problem of change and the problem of contingency at the same time by redefining what a particular consists of. In Casullo’s theory, a particular consists of a bundle of temporal slices related in some manner where each temporal slice consists of a co-instantiated set of properties. In general, Casullo says that an enduring thing is a series of momentary things all of which stand in some contingent relation. By stating that particulars consist of a bundle of temporal slices each of which consists of a co-instantiated set of properties, Casullo claims that two of Van Cleve’s objections are averted. Casullo’s version of the bundle theory successfully handles the problem of identity across time by subdividing a particular into a series of momentary things. As for the problem of individuation, Casullo’s version of the bundle theory attempts to solve the problem by showing that different particulars of a kind can be differentiated by comparing their co-instantiated properties, which seems to be a logical way of handling the problem.

The problem of the identity of indiscernibles relates to the face that the law itself is not widely accepted. Max Black proposed a possible world in which the only two objects that existed were perfect steel spheres with the same diameter and mass. These two objects are distinct separate objects even though they both have the same features and therefore disproving Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernibles. To get around the use of the Identity of Indiscernibles, Casullo proposes the use of “landmarks.” Using this tactic, all things have their spatio-temporal location by virtue of standing in certain relations to these landmarks. The landmarks themselves, however, do not have their spatio-temporal location by virtue of any relations to any other things.

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