Philosophy of Religion
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
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Philosophy of Religion
Introduction
This paper considers responses by Platinga to Mackie's logical argument and highlights crucial assumptions of the published literature scope. The Free will arguments and transworld depravity counteracts John Mackie arguments on logical problem of evil The paper identifies, analyzes and provides assumptions based on the free will defense to assist complete this assignment.
Plantinga's free will defense provides a case against the logical problem of John Mackie which illustrates that the attributes of God such as omnibenevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence do not associate with the evil presence. Plantinga's defense of free will starts with the assertion that Mackie’s ideology has not created a solid enough foundation to his argument to explicitly make the assumption of God and the presence of evil a contradiction.
Plantinga's defense proves that the attributes of God such as his omnipresence and others are not contradictory and if there is any then it must be based on theologies’ implicit assumptions that demonstrate elements which do not state in the argument. The explicit contradiction in logical problem of evil is overshadowed, and the theologies must add several instrumental ideologies to prove otherwise. However, if Plantinga has failed to provide further arguments the theologies intuitive illustrations that the contradictory statements will remain unanswered if the argument is not based on biblical facts. Plantinga provides a solution by expounding two significant ideologies.
In the first Ideology, Plantinga supports that God by omnipotence, is unexpected to do anything literally from His power. God cannot create a square circle which is contrary to His nature or create things out of free will that would be immune to opting for evil. Plantinga state that moral value existing in humanity free will so credit as offsetting rationalization that God could have a rational moral purpose for allowing the evil existence. Platinga does not claim to have provided the argument that assumptions of the logical problem are not right, and also does not support that Gods’ purpose to allow evil is meant to preserve the free will. Plantinga's argument shows that the consistent problem associated with crime is illogical.
Plantinga puts forward a defense that provides a new ground which is meant to illustrate that there is the logical possibility for God who is omniscient, omnibenevolent and omnipotent to develop a world which has moral evils. It is not necessary for Platinga to prove his position since it is considered to be logically valid from his arguments. Through this approach, there is difference existing between it and traditional theology which would focus to show that the new propositions by Plantinga are valid but instead illustrates the argument is logical, plausible or there is solid proof supporting the squabble.
The approach reduces the burden of proof on Platinga, and still, his method provides the strong counteraction to Mackie’s ideology that simultaneous presence of evil and Gods character is irrationally positive. The world has the creatures which are free to choose whether to act in ethical ways or do evil things, more appreciated, than the world with beings which are not open at all. God creates creatures but does not determine their characteristics and behavior. As such the beings shall not be free and will not practice their rightful doing freely. To create creatures which are morally upright, God should design them with capacity of practicing purely evil things but provide protection for them from natural evil. Unfortunately, some of God’s creatures followed the wrong path through the exercise of freedom to do evil things thus the origin of moral evil. The aspect of free beings being moral evil is independent from Gods omnipotence or any of His qualities; the only way God would have forestalled the existence of moral evil is by eliminating chances of moral good. Plantinga argues that despite God being omnipotent, there is the possibility that it was not his capability to create the world with moral good but no moral badness. There is no inconsistency which is logic to be associated with God, even though entirely reasonable, the creation of creatures who opt moral evil.
The Plantinga's arguments follow propositions that: there is the possibility of worlds even though omnipotent being can’t actualize and the existence of the world with creatures which are free to choose moral good. Plantinga mentions his first argument as Leibniz’s lapse since it is opposite to the scientist's assumption. The 2nd proposition is somewhat contentious; in his case, Platinga refutes the compatibilist idea of freedom in which God would intentionally make agents act in moral good without constraining their liberty.