Philosophy of Science for Iba

7.4 Anything goes

Feyerabend is the most controversial and adventurous figure in the post-Kuhn debates. Initially, he was influenced by Popper, but later on he was significantly influenced by Kuhn and vice versa.  

Feyerabend’s most famous work was his book Against Method. In this book, he argued for ‘epistemological anarchism’; opposed to all systems of rules and constraints in science. Great scientists, according to Feyerabend, are opportunistic and creative, willing to make use of any available technique for discovery and persuasion. Any attempt to establish rules of method in science will result only in a decrease of creativity. Feyerabend therefore said: ‘the only rule we can be sure of is ‘anything goes’; this rule won’t impede imagination and progress. 

Like Kuhn, Feyerabend thought that rival scientific theories are often linguistically incommensurable. Also, he argued that observations in science are contaminated with theoretical assumptions and hence cannot be considered a neutral test of theory.

At the beginning of his book, Feyerabend warned the reader not to interpret his arguments as ‘expressing my deepest convictions’, but instead ‘merely show how easy it is to lead people by the nose in a rational way’. He also argued that ‘the epistemological anarchist is like an undercover agent who uses reason in order to destabilize it’.

Feyerabend’s deepest conviction was that ‘science is an aspect of human creativity’.

Feyerabend could be compared to Wilde; his views were close to Feyerabend’s’; what is important in all intellectual work, including science, is the free development of creativity and imagination. Nothing should be allowed to interfere with this.

Feyerabend was one of the most perceptive critics (scherpzinnige critici) of Kuhn. Most philosophers of science found an alarming disorder in Kuhn’s view of science, yet Feyerabend found the opposite; an incitement (aansporing) for scientists to become orderly and mechanical.

Not clear: was Feyerabend’s view about Kuhn positive or negative?

Invisible hand in Kuhn’s ideas: individual narrow-mindedness is all for the best in science?

Feyerabend didn’t agree with Kuhn about the role of paradigms in normal science; he said that there are always imaginative individuals trying out new ideas, outside the kind of control the paradigm performs.

Feyerabend was not an enemy of science, but an enemy of some kinds of science. He admired the scientists of the 17th century, especially Galilei, since they opposed to the grip of the Catholic Church. Science, for Feyerabend, has gone from being an ally of freedom (thus, in the 17th century) to being an enemy. Scientist, according to him, are turning into ‘human ants’, entirely unable to think outside of their training. He argues that society has to be freed from the strangling hold of a domineering scientific establishment.

7.5 An argument from history that haunts philosophy

There is an argument from history that is most central to Feyerabend’s work. A large part of Against Method deals with a discussion of Galileo’s arguments against his Aristotelean opponents in the early seventeenth century. Galileo aimed to defend Copernicus’ claim that the earth goes round the sun rather than vice versa. Feyerabend claims that people in the seventeenth century had excellent reason to resist Galileo and believe that the earth is not moving (example of the tower and the ball) According to Feyerabend, what science had to do in this case, was breaking through the constraints of an outdated worldview. For Feyerabend, science is often a matter of challenging rather than following the lessons of observation. 

The Feyerabendian argument that haunts philosophy of science is the question whether traditional philosophical accounts of how science works, especially empiricist accounts, instructed us to work with the Aristotelians rather than take a bet on Galileo.

Feyerabend claims that because some principle or rule may go wrong, we should completely ignore it. Obviously, this is crazy. The possibility that a rule might lead to bad consequences proves very little. We need more than a mere possibility before we have grounds to doubt a principle. Science may profit from all kinds of strange decisions, but ‘may’ is not enough.

7.6 Pluralism and the ramblings of madmen

For Feyerabend, science benefits from the presence of a range of alternative ideas and perspectives. In his view, rules are made to be broken.

Feyerabend proposed two general principles that guide science:

) principle of tenacity; we should hold onto attractive theories despite initial problems and allow them a chance to develop their potential.

) principle of proliferation; we should make up new theories and propose new ideas.

Feyerabend’s ideal picture of science is thus; a population of people happily developing their theories and also trying to think up new ones.