The Hermit Sailor Case

The Hermit Sailor Case

        The topic of this paper is The Hermit Sailor Case which considers what actions are either ethical or justified per a human’s rights and morals. The question is whether or not it would be permissible for a sailor to push an innocent person, who randomly landed in it, off of their boat since that other person was not invited and now causing a huge inconvenience to the sailor.  It is assumed that this other person, named Bowie, would drown if pushed off the boat, but if kept on the boat, the sailor would not be able to fulfill his dream of becoming the first person to perform a solo circumnavigation of the world in that type of boat. I do not believe that it is morally permissible to push Bowie off of the boat. In this paper, I will first state that Judith Jarvis Thomson would say it is morally permissible to push Bowie off of the boat since he had no right to be there and keeping Bowie on the boat would constitute a large sacrifice. Next I will show that Marquis would argue it is impermissible to push Bowie off the boat because he has a future like ours, which would make the act murder and therefore morally wrong. After defining the two philosophers’ points of view, I will explain why I agree with Marquis and his reasoning for why it is wrong to push Bowie off of the boat. I will first argue that pushing Bowie off would still be a crime and is therefore not permissible. Then I will argue against Thomson’s idea that this would constitute a large enough sacrifice for the sailor that it would be okay to end his life. I will end the paper by explaining how this can connect to the issue of abortion.

        For clarification purposes, the hermit sailor case is as follows:

Suppose you’re on a boat ⎯ it’s your boat ⎯ in the middle of the ocean. And you’re trying to become the first person to successfully perform a solo circumnavigation of the globe in this particular kind of boat. (That means that nobody else can inhabit your boat for very long or else you’ll be disqualified from having that title.) You’ve been planning all of this for several years. Now suppose a person ⎯let’s call this person Bowie⎯ falls out of the sky and lands on your boat unharmed. Bowie is an innocent person just like you and me. Taking Bowie to land and starting your circumnavigation over again would be costly: not only will you have two mouths to feed for a while (you have enough supplies for the two of you, since you brought extras in case of an emergency), but getting Bowie back to the closest land and starting your solo journey anew will take about nine months all told (it’s a slow boat and a long journey and you’ll have to resupply after dropping Bowie off, et cetera!). Now, you don’t want to kill Bowie because that would violate Bowie’s right to life. But you do want this to remain a solo circumnavigation ⎯this is an important personal project you’ve been planning for several years, after all. Is it permissible for you to (gently) push Bowie off of your boat and into the ocean intending to keep this a solo mission with the expected (and certain) consequence that Bowie will eventually drown to death?

        Thomson’s point of view would be that it would be morally permissible to push Bowie off of the boat. The important thing to explain before going into Thomson’s point of view is the difference between positive and negative rights. Positive rights are those entitle you to be provided with some good or service. For example, we have a right to be judged under an unbiased jury before being given a sentence. A negative right is the right to not have someone commit an action toward you that may cause you harm, for example, the right to not be murdered. Thomson argues that Bowie does not have a positive right to use the boat to live. She says that the right to life is a negative right to not be harmed, but it is not a right to use others or their property to sustain your life. The only way that one can acquire a positive right is if it is granted, or the positive right does not require a large sacrifice from someone else. Thomson argues that pushing him off of the boat doesn’t violate his right to life, and is therefore permissible, because Bowie did not have the right to be on the boat in the first place. The sailor never said that Bowie could come onto the boat, nor is it a small sacrifice for the sailor to keep him there, so it would not be morally wrong to push him off by Thomson’s rationale.          

        Although the sailor did not directly grant Bowie the right to come on the boat, Thomson evaluates if because the sailor had foresight that there was a possibility someone may fall in his boat and depend on it for survival, his going out on the boat anyway would constitute a granting of rights. In other words, since the sailor knew he could possibly be in a situation like this, and he still chose to go sailing, Thomson considers whether or not this could be seen as a granting of rights. She argues that this would not count as granting Bowie the right to use the boat. Thomson says that just because someone does something does not mean they want, nor knowingly allow a negative consequence to happen. Thomson uses an example of someone who opens a window at night to let in fresh air. If someone breaks into that person’s house because they left the window open for air, does that mean it was morally permissible for that person to rob them? Does opening a window for fresh air mean that someone would be okay with someone robbing their house? The answer would be no because the foresight of a possible outcome is not enough to be considered a granted right according to Thomson. Just because someone does something that has a small chance of resulting in a negative consequence does not mean that the consequence is their fault or responsibility.