To What Extent Is Perception Itself Adequate Enough as the only Way of Knowing?

To what extent is perception itself adequate

enough as the only way of knowing?

Mert Erenel

        Is our reality that we live in…actual reality? For hundreds and thousands of years, realist philosophers have pondered that question. As a result, there have been many theories and methods as to what reality is. One branch of those is the knowing through senses. The theory, which states that the only way of knowing is through one’s own sensory experience, is called empiricism. Along with skepticism and rationalism, empiricism emphasizes the role of evidence through experience and that no knowledge should be accepted due to a priori* reasoning or intuition. The concept bases itself through observations of the natural world. But this can be refuted due to the fallibility of perception. [1]

        Known as the Father of modern philosophy, Rene Descartes was revolutionary in his method of doubting the truth. In his method, full certainty could only be achieved if all falsehoods are eradicated. Thus, leading to the way of “doubting anything that can be doubted”. This includes us to doubt our conclusions through senses as sense can also be doubtable. For example, if I were to put a stick into a water it will “look” as if it bends, but it will “feel” straight. For this we can assume that one of our two senses is deceiving us…or maybe both. [2] 

        In Plato’s famous allegory of the cave, the individuals that are strapped down can only see shadows of objects, which they accept these shadows as real objects. They are ignorant of the fact that the shadows are just an imperfect copy of reality. Due to these perceptual illusions, the individual cannot see the true nature of the object. However, it also goes into question that if the object is more real than the shadow then wouldn’t there be something more real than the object? For this is named the realm of forms*, the world we perceive, just like in Plato’s allegory, consists of imperfect copies of these forms; in which we can conclude that perceiving is not the way of knowing. [3]