What Am I?

Samuel Lee

Charles Myers

PHI 2010

11 December 2007

What am I?

In Theodore Dalrymple’s article, based on his recent neuropsychiatry conference, he disagreed that scientific self-understanding, in which he defined as “the explanation of an infinite number of unique events that are infused with meaning and intentionality,” was both possible and desirable. He stated that a universal law that “accounts for the infinite variety and originality of human utterance” or any method that attempted to fully explain human behavior could not exist. Dalrymple further explained that it would not be desirable to achieve a complete self-understanding. If it were to happen, it wouldn’t be long before someone would construct a mind-reading scanner that gave one access to everyone’s thoughts at will. Of course if one were to construct such a powerful device, he or she would not be willing to simply give it out to the hands of the general public, but rather keep it to themselves, thus disturbing the balance of power and leaving out thoughts at his mercy. As Dalrymple generalized in his article, “life would be hell.”

In the study of self-identity, Hume argues that we can never find an impression of an object or substance to explain the identity of plants, animals, and things. To support himself, Dalrymple mentioned David Hume in his article. Hume, both a figure of enlightenment and anti-enlightenment, believes in reason and experience, but not an extreme view such as the wholly rational man. According to Hume, we are never justified in claiming that a person or an object maintains the same identity. Using his famous tree example, Hume deducts that the same tree we see that we saw five years ago has undergone a complete change, every cell replaced by new ones. To solve this, he proposes that the tree is in the same place at different times, or as he labels, spatiotemporal continuity. Because we do not have an impression of the self-understanding, Hume, like Dalrymple, would conclude that the idea of self understanding is a fiction.

Locke on the other hand, opposes this view. According to Locke, self-identity is based upon self-consciousness, memories created from our former experiences. He argued that our identity is to be found in the continuity of our consciousness rather than in the body. Since memory is a type of thought, one cannot remember the experiences of another person; however, because one could remember the things he or she experienced before in the past, he or she is self-identical to the person who had the earlier experience. Locke then classifies memory into two sub groups, genuine and apparent. While genuine memories are the correct memories that you have had from prior experience, apparent memories are inaccurate memories based on events that never happened. Memories are what make the self. When applied to the scientific self-understanding issue proposed in Dalrymple’s article, Locke’s theory of self-identity would help grasp a more solid understanding of the human nature by first having a sense of self identity. His theory would also reject neuropsychiatry since it relies solely on the consciousness over the body, thus rendering any progress made through neuroscience garbage.

In the study of the mind and body, or also known as dualism, Descartes explains the mind and the body as two separate/different substances. Although many philosophers have had trouble explaining how the mind and body were connected, certain properties of mind, the lack of “extension” and seeming “privileged access” and the “incorrigibility” of mental claims, made the mind and body connection very complex. Colin McGinn, a British philosopher, contributed some of his thoughts in his work, “The Mystery of Consciousness.” McGinn made one of the most provocative theses on the mind-body problem, which argued that consciousness is a “mystery” and cannot be explained by neither philosophy nor science. According to “mysterianism”, humans are cognitively closed with respect to the solution to the problem. Just as it is certainly impossible for a dog to solve a mathematical problem, it is also impossible for us to solve the mind-body problem. This in turn would tend to support Dalrymple’s views since McGinn rejects the possibility of humans grasping consciousness and opposes science in explaining consciousness, a vital portion of self-understanding.

Australian philosopher J.J.C. Smart on the other hand, takes a completely opposing view on this topic. His viewpoint strongly takes side with science and considers organisms as mere physico-chemical mechanisms. He defines states of consciousness as sensations and