The Ethics of Cloning Humans

“Cloning? It’s just wrong!” Most likely, this is the first thing that pops into the majority of the general public’s head when faced with the issue. The disgust of the public should hardly be taken as a rational argument, or should it? Lord Patrick Devlin thought so, and produced a strong argument for it (Almond & Parker, 2003) Aside from this, there are an assortment of strong arguments and examples supporting cloning which the public should be aware of before taking a stance. Suppose the instance of two parents losing their infant child at the age of two weeks; they cannot have another one. Would the public be so quick to condemn cloning if it meant that those parents could experience the joy of raising a child, albeit the clone of the original infant (Almond & Parker, 2003)? If society allowed cloning for this instance, where would the line be drawn? Looking at both sides of the argument, it is reasonable to allow cloning in certain cases as long as safeguards are in place to ensure responsibility and accountability.

Before looking at the arguments and reaching a conclusion, one must first understand what human cloning actually is. Cloning, as defined by The President’s Council on BioEthics (2005), is: “the asexual reproduction of a new human organism that is, at all stages of development, genetically virtually identical to a currently existing, or previously existing, human being.” Subsequently, this definition leads readers to assume, sometime unknowingly, two views concerning cloning, First, is that the clone is an exact replica, physically and mentally, of the original parent donor. Second, is that the process of human cloning produces fully formed adults. Both of these are wrong. Although cloning produces for the most part a physical replica, similar to that of identical twins, it is impossible for science at this point in time to create an exact copy of the “mind”. In other words, consciousness cannot be cloned (Rollin, 2006). The most popular form for cloning humans would theoretically be through Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer. It is the process by which the nucleus of a an egg cell is replaced with that of one wished to be cloned. It is then implanted into a female uterus and is delivered just as a naturally conceived child would (AAMC, 2006). Federal funding for human cloning is illegal in the United States. Legislation proposing the ban of human cloning has been passed by the House of Representatives but has not been cleared by the Senate (Human cloning, n.d). Clearly, there is some debate over human cloning in which both sides of the argument need to be carefully examined.

A key argument for opponents of human cloning revolves around moral judgments. Critics of human cloning are frequently heard arguing that human cloning “plays God” or that it’s just not natural. Other arguments are that it violates the dignity of the individual and the sanctity of marriage. Stanley Harakas, a professor of Orthodox Theology at Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology (Karras, 2005) said,

…Further, in itself, cloning would violate practically every sacramental dimension of marriage, family life, physical and spiritual nurture, and the integrity and dignity of the human person (Rollin, 2006).

Some make claims based on history in which arrogance always came before downfall, such as the Tower of Babel; and still others say that cloning rejects the idea that children are a product of “mutual love” between a man and a woman, and that this symbolizes the the many mysteries of gender differences (Rollin, 2006). All these claims have one very important thing in common: They are all based on emotions, morals, and the idea that something just “feels wrong (or right).” Is this enough? Lord Patrick Devlin argued that under certain circumstances, feelings and moral instincts do serve as a solid basis for beliefs and actions.

Respected judge and philosopher Lord Patrick Devlin (Devlin, n.d) wrote that public feelings, or moral instinct, are justifiably allowed to shape law making, even in issues concerning private matters. At first glance this seems preposterous, but Devlin makes a strong case for it. In fact, he argues that it is not so much of a far-fetched idea considering that many active laws already govern over private matters in Western society. Such laws include those that prohibit voluntary euthanasia, animal cruelty, dueling and incest. Surely these acts could be carried out in the privacy of one’s home without affecting any other person in the slightest manner. The reason for these laws, Devlin argues, is a moral consensus held by the general public in that these acts “provoke certain strong negative feelings” in society. This, however, does not mean that Devlin supported passing laws over private issues based on whims of the general public. To give Devlin’s theory some defensibility, it needs a reasoned method