Nuclear Warfare

Over the past few decades, ways of living with nuclear weapons have evolved, creating political systems that everyone hopes will prevent such weapons from ever being used. The main feature of these systems is known as nuclear deterrence. Quite soon after the destructive power of nuclear weapons was realized, people understood that an active defense, such as shooting down bombers, was impossible. But a passive defense (building air raid shelters, evacuating peple, etc.) would not do much good either. Safety could only come from persuading potential attackers not to attack at all. This could best be done by convincing them that they would suffer an equally bad attack in return. This threat of retaliation, therefore, would perhaps serve to deter the possible aggressor.

While deterrence is not a new idea, what is new about nuclear deterrence is, first, that it may be the only defense possible and, secondly, that a well-designed nuclear force could create retaliatory threats so great that no leader would ever act to bring about such destruction deliberately. Consequently, whatever its other military policies, each of the nuclear powers has tried to develop a nuclear retaliatory force that could--even if its enemies struck first--deliver in a second strike a blow that would result in unacceptable damage to the aggressor. That is the principle behind nuclear deterrence.

It can be argued that nuclear deterrence is effective because no nuclear weapons have been used in warfare ever since 1945, but a world of nuclear deterrence has several obvious drawbacks:

Because nuclear weapons continue to exist, there is the permanent danger of catastrophe, and the system might produce catastrophe rather than stalemate.

The system requires that nuclear powers regard each other as possible enemies, keeping calculating military balances against each other, and watching nervously for signs that others have found ways to break the stalemate in their favor and engage in nuclear blackmail, or even an attack.

While, theorectically, deterrence could be maintained by only a few nuclear weapons, the kind of suspicion and uncertainty that exists tends to drive nuclear powers to heavy expenditures in order to increase or improve their arsenals. This, in turn, reinforces mutual