Why Were Losing the War on Terror

The Failure of the “War on Terror”

Joshua Tong

250727004

Political Science 1020E

July 24, 2016

        The fall of the Twin Towers on September 11th, 2001, led President George W. Bush of the United States of America, to declare a ‘war on terror', one that continues to this day.  Bush addressed the nation after the attacks, stating that the attacks were caused by the terrorists hatred for American Freedom.  On October 7th, 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom officially made the ‘war on terror' a reality.  The US invaded Afghanistan.  The Bush administration justified the invasion of Afghanistan, as a means to capture the terrorists responsible for the attacks and end the oppressive Taliban rule of law.  In 2003, the US invaded Iraq.  Nations pledged their allegiance to the US to help in the ‘war on terror'. As a result, Afghanistan and Iraq have become far more unstable due to the invasion by the US and its Allies.  Furthermore, policies stemming from the ‘war on terror' have created a culture of fear and stigmatization against Muslims around the world - policies that protect our freedom, but violate them at the same time.  This essay will examine why the ‘war on terror' has been a failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, influenced policies that have violated the rights of Arabs and US citizens in the US, and negatively affected global politics.  

        Before Operation Enduring Freedom was launched, the US sent in the CIA to make contact with the Northern Alliance (NA).  The NA was led, mainly by non-Pashtun warlords, who were in the midst of fighting a losing battle against the Taliban (WWLTWOT pg 122/74).  The NA would provide military assistance to US forces on the ground and knowledge of the terrain, in return for military equipment.  A year into the conflict, the US was highly confident they would defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.  Bush's State of the Union Address on January 29th, 2002, declared the Afghanistan war a success, with plans to expand the ‘war on terror' into Iraq (WWLTW pg 77).  However, one of the biggest mistakes the US made, was to underestimate the Taliban and Al-Qaeda by dispatching an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of only 5,000 troops.  The UN Deputy Special Envoy in Afghanistan, Francesc Vendrell, insisted that 30,000 ISAF troops, and at least four to five billion dollars of international aid, was required to implement stability in the region (WWLTWOT pg 86).  These requests were never met by the US or its Allies.  ISAF was unable to police regions far from Kabul due to the shortage of troops, regions which were infamously controlled by warlords from the NA using weapons supplied  by the US government (WWLTWOT pg 78/79).  The Taliban, assumed by the US government to have been defeated, exploited the lack of order in the region. Thus, a resurgence of Taliban attacks created massive insecurity again in 2003, a situation that is still ongoing.  The International NGO Safety Organization's (INSO's) most current report on Afghanistan, shows that the Taliban have been able to conduct aggressive military operations across the country.  This is due to an increase in recruitment, the gradual pull-out of US troops from Afghanistan starting in 2013, and the switchover of military power to the Afghanistan National Army (ANA).  The ANA's military commanders appointed by US officials, having little knowledge of military strategy and organization,  have been linked to allegations of corruption, and human rights abuses.  The INSO's report on Afghanistan cites 2014 of having the highest levels of armed conflict, as the ANA have failed to fill the security gap left by US troops and its Allies.  Thus, the ‘war on terror' has subsequently failed in Afghanistan, leaving it more insecure than ever before.  The expansion into Iraq has mirrored similar consequences and has possibly become far more detrimental for the region.  

        The failure of the ‘war on terror' in Iraq stems from the lack of understanding, organization, and follow-through from the US military and policy makers.  They failed to form a concrete plan prior to the invasion of Iraq, underestimating the military strength of Al-Qaeda and their availability to weapons and ammunition dumps scattered around the country.  Further issues extended from the support the US received from Israel in 2003 (wwltwot 104), as many Arab majority countries shared the view of Israel being an oppressive regime against its Arab population. Thus, the perception of the conflict was viewed as a neo-Christian-Zionist crusade (WWLTWOT pg 105).  This newly shaped perception of the war by Arab majority countries, influenced anti-American sentiments, especially in Iraq.  However, the most detrimental decision from the US invasion was to replace a Sunni majority government with a Shia majority government, and the dissolution of the Iraqi Army.  This had major repercussions.  Historically, under the rule of Saddam Hussein's Sunni majority government, the Shia were oppressed.  Thus, when the US government introduced the Shia majority government, chaos was imminent - reprisal attacks and the illegal imprisonment of thousands of Sunnis would lead to a civil war.  Al-Qaeda would use the ensuing chaos to garner support from Sunnis to fight the US, its Allied forces, and the newly formed Iraqi army.  The conflict between Sunnis, Shia and the Americans and their Allied forces became increasingly more brutal, as policies disproportionately affected Sunnis.  Sunni majority regions became the hunting ground for ‘Islamic terrorists' and were bombarded by US airstrikes, killing thousands of civilians.  What further increased the Al-Qaeda insurgency in Iraq was the US detention of thousands of suspected terrorists without any legal proceedings, many of whom were Sunni (wwltwot 96).  This discriminatory approach against Sunnis fueled the civil war and created thousands of recruits from Iraq and neighboring countries for Al-Qaeda.  Today, Iraq is far worse off since the US-led invasion and the infamous extremist group, commonly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), is the consequence of the ‘war on terror' in Iraq. The INSO's most recent report on Iraq estimates that 3.5 million Iraqis have been displaced by the conflict and that 1.7 million Iraqis live outside government control, facing further instability due to the ongoing sectarian violence.  The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that around 8.2 million Iraqis are currently in need of humanitarian aid.