Cyberlaunderin

Cyberlaundering:

Anonymous Digital Cash and Money Laundering

Copyright 1996 R. Mark Bortner

The author hereby grants the right to copy this article in its entirety or any portion thereof by any means possible and to distribute such copies freely and without charge. The author simply requests that when a portion of this article or its entirety is included within another work, that such copied material be clearly and correctly cited to.

Presented as final paper requirement for Law & the Internet (LAW 745).

A seminar at the University of Miami School of Law.

Introduction

This article will explore the latest technique in money laundering: Cyberlaundering by means of anonymous digital cash. Part I is a brief race through laundering history. Part II discusses how anonymous Ecash may facilitate money laundering on the Intenet. Part III examines the relationship between current money laundering law and cyberlaundering. Part IV addresses the underlying policy debate surrounding anonymous digital currency. Essentially, the balance between individual financial privacy rights and legitimate law enforcement interests. In conclusion, Part V raises a few unanswered societal questions and attempts to predict the future.

Disclaimer:

Although the author discusses this subject in a casual, rather than rigidly formal tone, money laundering is a serious issue which should not be taken lightly. As this article will show, fear of money laundering only serves to increase banking regulations which, in turn, affect everyone's ability to conduct convenient, efficient and relatively private financial transactions.

Part I Humble Beginnings

In the beginning, laundering money was a physical effort. The art of concealing the existence, the illegal source, or illegal application of income, and then disguising that income to make it appear legitimate 1 required that the launderer have the means to physically transport the hard cash.2 The trick was, and still is, to avoid attracting unwanted attention, thus alerting the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and other government agencies 3 involved in searching out ill-gotten gains.4

In what could be described as the "lo-tech" world of money laundering, the process of cleaning "dirty money" was limited by the creative ability to manipulate the physical world. Other than flying cash out of one country and depositing it in a foreign bank with less stringent banking laws,5 bribing a bank teller, or discretely purchasing real or personal property, the classic approach was for a "smurf"6 to deposit cash at a bank. Essentially, platoons of couriers assaulted the lobbies of banks throughout the United States with deposits under the $10,000 reporting limit as required under the Bank Secrecy Act.7 The result was the formation of a serious loophole under the Bank Secrecy Act, allowing couriers almost limitless variables in depositing dirty money such as the number of banks, the number of branch offices, the number of teller stations at one branch office, the number of instruments purchased, the number of accounts at each bank, and the number of persons depositing the money.

In 1986, the Money Laundering Control Act (the Act)8 attempted to close the loopholes in the prior law that allowed for the structuring of transactions to flourish.9 In criminalizing the structuring of transactions to avoid reporting requirements, Congress attempted to "hit criminals right where they bruise: in the pocketbook."10 Under the Act, the filing of a currency transaction report (CTR)11 is required even if a bank employee "has knowledge" of any attempted structuring.12 Thus, it appeared as if the ability to launder the profits from illegal activity would be severely hampered.

As the physical world of money laundering began to erode, the tendency to use electronic transfers to avoid detection gained a loyal following. Electronic transfers of funds are known as wire transfers.13 Wire transfer systems allow criminal organizations, as well as legitimate businesses and individual banking customers, to enjoy a swift and nearly risk free conduit for moving money between countries.14 Considering that an estimated 700,000 wire transfers occur daily in the United States, moving well over $2 trillion, illicit wire transfers are easily hidden.15 Federal agencies estimate that as much as $300 billion is laundered annually, worldwide.16 As the mountain of stored, computerized information regarding these transfers reaches for the virtual stars