Freedom of Will
By: Mikki • Essay • 597 Words • December 10, 2009 • 873 Views
Essay title: Freedom of Will
Freedom of Will
In the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, by Immanuel Kant, he presents a clear insight on moral principles. He tries to achieve this by giving his definition of what a good will is and should be. Kant also makes an effort to describe how the will is free; thus, people are able to make their own decisions on how to live their lives according to the "moral law." By doing so, he ended up laying the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. This essay will contain the role of freedom in Kant's account of the moral law.
We must first define the role that a will plays according to the moral law. What is a will? A "will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational" (Grounding, 52). Kant assumes that every rational being has a reason or a cause for why different events happen, or what he calls a will. He goes on to suppose that the will is free. But in order to make this claim, he must assume that all rational beings have the capability to have a free will. Kant deems that this assertion cannot be proven based on experience; therefore, it is a synthetic proposition. How is a will free and what constitutes it as being free?
What is freedom? According to Kant, freedom is acting independent of our desires governed by moral laws. In the Grounding, freedom plays a critical role for rational beings. The idea of freedom is misleading says Kant, because when most people think of freedom they think that their spontaneous actions are synonymous with being free. Yet, they don't understand that they are only acting on desires and inclinations to better themselves.
The notion of a free will is a categorical imperative and autonomous claim because its derivable from universal principles and it has the property of being a law to itself. (Grounding, xi-xii, 52) A free will is said to have both of these qualities because it is derivable from universal principles and is a law to itself. With this said, freedom must also be synthetic a priori judgment.