Systematic Rationalization of Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War

Systematic Rationalization of Thucydides' Peloponnesian War

The Peloponnesian War, being one of the earliest wars with a good historical record, sets an important precedent for those interested in international relations. The information related by Thucydides in his writings on the war allows comparisons to be drawn with modern wars and conclusions to be drawn. One of the most important of these conclusions that may be drawn is that, like in modern times, the balance of power between states in an anarchic international society, if upset or perceived to have been upset, will bring nations to war. This is evidenced strongly in Thucydides writings on the Peloponnesian War, and while other factors may have led to war, it is unlikely that any of the Greek city-states of Hellas would have gone to war.

When one hears of anarchy, immediately thoughts of chaos and disorder enter the mind, but in the international system of anarchy, many events are predictable. To a degree disorder is present, as war is always possible, and nearly always an imminent danger. However, international events such as war may be predicted. In an anarchic system there is an ever-present uncertainty of the future and uncertainty of the intentions of other states. In the Greek world of Thucydides described in his history of the Peloponnesian War, the opposing states' uncertainty of the others' intentions led to a security dilemma in which Sparta was forced to increase its security to match the seemingly increasing security of Athens. The building of Athens' long walls protecting its naval power and its interference in Corcyra were important events in beginning the war, primarily because of the dramatic increase in Athenian power these events represented to the Spartans. These actions put Athens in a strong position to increase its power steadily in the coming years, also steadily decreasing Spartan power forcing Sparta into a situation in which it must increase its own security in order to hold the strength of the Athenians in check. It is with this intention that the Spartans gave an ultimatum to Athens after its interference in Corcyra. "Sparta wishes the peace to continue, and there is no reason why it should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent," was their statement, implying that further Athenian expansion and interference would lead to war between the two states. (Thucydides 5.15) Corinth, the nation that opposed Corcyra and its Athenian allies, urged Sparta to enter the war against the Athenians and "warned them against failing to check the rising power of Athens." (Nye 14) Sparta debated the issue of war before issuing the ultimatum, and while there were calls for peace, even from Sparta's King Archidamus, it was decided that Athenian power must be checked. As many states would do in the future, Sparta decided upon the course of action that would put them in the best possible position within the Greek security dilemma presented to the opposing states.

The anarchic international system structure is a delicate balance, often necessitating war to keep this balance. The Greek world of Thucydides had reached a moment in which the system dictated war in order to keep this "balance of power," and while other factors surely contributed, the need for balance in an anarchic system was the definitive cause for the Peloponnesian War. Were the system organized rather than anarchic, power could be distributed by a higher authority, but due to lack of such authority, those with the highest capabilities have the power. It is because of this that states work to always have the highest capabilities available to them in order to increase power, forcing other states to do the same. When a state sees itself falling behind in this race for higher and higher capabilities, it is forced to act, as Sparta did with its ultimatum to Athens, or risk becoming structurally subservient to the higher power of the opposing state. In a situation like this war reaches a degree of probability bordering on certainty, regardless of other variables.

The faults of man are ever-present in war, but simply because they exist in war does not make them the cause. In the case of the Peloponnesian War, a potential unbalance of power placed war on the horizon and human nature drove the Greeks towards that horizon, speeding Athens to its defeat. In his final speech before war Pericles of Athens claims, "Now it was clear before that Sparta entertained designs against us; it is still more clear now." (Thucydides 5.17) He hastened Athens