Tennessee V. Reeves. 917 S.W.2d 825 (supreme Court of Tennessee, 1996)

Tennessee v. Reeves. 917 S.W.2d 825 (Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1996)

On the evening of January 5, 1993, Tracie Reeves and Molly Coffman, both twelve years of age and students at West Carroll Middle School, spoke on the telephone and decided to kill their homeroom teacher, Janice Geiger. They agreed that Coffman would bring rat poison to school the following days so that it could be placed in Geiger’s drink. After that , they would steal Geiger’s car and drive to the Smoky Mountains. On the morning of January 6, Coffman placed a packet of rat poison in her purse and board the school bus. Coffman told another student, Christy Hernandez, of the plan and show her the poison. Hernandez went and informed her homeroom teacher, Sherry Cockrill. Cockrill then informed the school principal, Claudia Argo. When Geiger entered her classroom that morning, she observed Reeves and Coffman leaning over her deck; and when the girls noticed her, they giggled and ran back to their seats. Geiger saw a purse lying next to her coffee cup on the top of the desk. Shortly after Argo called Coffman to the principal’s office, rat poison was found in Coffman’s purse. Both Reeves and Coffman gave written statement to the Sheriff investigator concerning their plan to poison Geiger and steal her car.

Reeves and Coffman were found to be delinquent by the Carroll County Juvenile Court, and both appealed from that ruling to the Carroll County Circuit Court. After a jury found that the girls attempted to commit second degree murder in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. Section(s) 19-12-101, the “criminal attempt” statute, the trial court affirmed the juvenile court order and sentenced the girl to the Department of Youth development for an indefinite period.

The issue in this case is to determine whether the defendant’s action in this case constitute a “substantial step” toward the commission of second degree murder under the new statue. The “substantial step” issue has not yet been addressed by a Tennessee court in a published opinion, and question is made more difficult by the fact that the legislature declined to set forth any definition of the term, preferring instead to “leave the issue of what constitutes a substantial step [to the court] for determination in each particular case”.

Yes. The Court of Appeals is affirmed the decision of the lower court and upheld the conviction of the defendant.

The court had reason that even though the defendant did not place the poison in the cup, but simply brought it to the crime scene, we also are well aware that the attempt law has been consistently and effectively criticized. One persistent criticism of the endeavor to separate “mere preparation” from the “act itself” is merely one of the termini on a continuum of criminal activity.

State v. Kobel. 927 S.W.2d 445 (Missouri Appellate Court, Western District, 1996)

Two vehicles, including Mr. Kobel’s, were moving together along Main Street near Eighteenth Street in downtown Kansas City in the early morning hours of December 13, 1993. Both vehicle stopped in front of a bar called “Illusions”, knows as a bar frequented by homosexuals. A total of five males, including Mr. Kobel, exited the two vehicles and began crossing the street toward the bar at approximately the same time. Mr. Kobel was carrying a can of Mace; and other male, Christopher Anderson, carried a mental bar used to lock an automotive steering wheel into place. Mr. Kobel and other males were yelling hostile and derogatory remakes concerning sexual orientation to a group of women near the entrance of the bar. Mr. Tucker, the Illusions’ bouncer, stood guard outside the door while the women took refuge in the bar. Mr. Anderson assaulted Mr. Tucker by hitting him twice in the head with the metal steering wheel bar. Then Mr. Kobel sprayed Mace in Mr. Tucker’s face. Mr. Tucker fell to the ground. All five males left the scene at the same time and drove off in the same direction.

The jury apparently did not believe Mr. Kobel’s story, for it convicted him of second-degree assault and armed criminal action

The defendant argued that the State has failed to prove his acted as an accomplice of Mr. Anderson, and used of a dangerous instrument; moreover, the court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree, and exclusion of the prior