The Civil Reserve Air Fleet

Abstract

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a partnership between the Department of Defense and commercial airlines where the airlines contractually commit a portion of their aircraft and crews to be used by the Department in the event of any level of military conflict. These aircraft can be "called up" and required to respond quickly to provide airlift support to the Department of Defense. There are minimum required levels of participation in order for the airlines to be eligible, and in turn they receive peace time business including passenger and cargo movement approximately in proportion to their commitment level. The program is divided into three segments which include varying amounts and sizes of aircraft that serve specific purposes. There are also three levels of activation depending on the severity of the conflict, which also require different amounts and sizes of aircraft. This program has been in place for nearly 53 years, and has become an essential partnership required for an effective United States military. The following pages are an investigation various aspects of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet such as its purpose, history, and effectiveness.

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a network of select aircraft from several commercial airlines that are all committed in various amounts to the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide airlift resources when the capability of U.S. military aircraft is exceeded. This system is designed so that these carriers can provide military cargo movement and troop transportation to anywhere in the world on short notice in the event of a military conflict. In order for airlines to join the CRAF, they must commit at least 30 percent of their long-range passenger fleet and 15 percent of their long-range cargo planes (Fact Sheet, 2004). These aircraft must also be U.S. registered, capable of over water operations, and have at least four complete crews assigned for each aircraft (Fact Sheet, 2004). Airlines that participate in CRAF have provided vital support to our military since the Korean War (Graham, David, 2003). The Persian Gulf War was the first official activation of the CRAF, where two thirds of the troops and one quarter of the air cargo was moved by commercial airplanes (Graham, 2003). Though not officially activated, the CRAF is currently supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom, providing nearly double the amount of aircraft that the DoD has estimated for its most demanding war strategies. This paper will provide a brief explanation of the purpose of the CRAF, its history, the effectiveness of the program, and a quick look towards the future of the CRAF.

Purpose

The CRAF program gives the DoD access to a huge reserve of commercial aircraft, the crews to operate them, fuel, and any other resources required to operate them (Graham, 2003). They can be activated and given as little as 24-48 hours notice to be ready to move military forces and equipment to anywhere in the world. There are currently approximately 250 cargo aircraft involved which is 86 percent of the long-haul cargo fleets of the participants (Graham, 2003). Passenger aircraft consist of approximately 479 which are 70 percent of the participants' long-haul passenger planes (Graham, 2003). This section will discuss the main incentive the airlines receive for participation in the program, the three main segments of CRAF, and will provide an explanation of the three stages of activation of the CRAF.

The main incentive for airlines to commit their aircraft to CRAF is the access to serve government markets in peacetime operations which represents over $2 billion dollars per year in revenue (Graham, 2003). Nearly half of this revenue is DoD's passenger and cargo charter business, which is divided up between CRAF participants approximately in proportion to their total commitment of aircraft (Graham, 2003). The rest of this peacetime revenue consists of a separate passenger and express cargo market program, and required that each participant commit at least 30 percent of their long-haul fleet (Graham, 2003). This peacetime business incentive is crucial in maintaining the required commitment level from airlines to the CRAF. If it weren't for this guaranteed business, many airlines would not participate in the program, especially the larger carriers. "Small carriers are more likely to benefit financially when CRAF is activated, whereas larger scheduled carriers are apt to be more concerned about losing market share to foreign competitors and rivals who are not in the program. Since small carriers often do not operate scheduled routes, CRAF activation represents additional business for them and is not as disruptive as it may be to larger scheduled carriers (Participation in the Civil Reserve