The Imf Is a Convenient Scapegoat for the Failure of Politicians to Properly Manage the Economies of Their Countries

The first contacts of Mexico with the IMF policies began in 1976 after the collapse of the Mexican peso. The collapse was the result of a very active role of the Mexican government in the economy without much regard for macroeconomic balances. Generally in Mexico there had always been two positions regarding the economy: the first one in favour of a strong privatisation process and the importance of opening the economy, including the financial sector; the second one favouring an active participation of the government in the productive sector, the protection of the national industry and the slowing down of the financial liberalisation process.

This essay will undertake a brief review of the involvement of the IMF in the structural adjustment policies in Mexico, particularly the measures taken for the economic crisis of 1994-1995. This paper will highlight the fragmented opinions towards the role of the IMF in the economic liberalization of Mexico, as well as the management of the crisis to show that there is not a unified opinion on the IMF. Furthermore, this essay will argue that the IMF is not the conventional scapegoat for politicians as in the cases of other Latin American countries due to the nature of the relations of the IMF with the Mexican government. Such relations led to a much closer and colluded relationship among both actors. During the 1994-1995 crisis, the Mexican government,