Abortion Debate

Kashani, Kevin
Philosophy 5
Professor Gulick

Reflection Paper

        The authors present an argument that asserts that the choice of abortion is immoral. A human embryo, a living being, is killed during the act of abortion. They state that as early as eight or ten weeks of gestation, the fetus has a fully formed, with a beating heart, a complete brain, a recognizably human form, and it feels pain, cries, and even sucks his or her thumb. The embryo is distinct from any cell of the mother or father, it is human, and is a complete organism which may develop into the mature stage of human being (unless prevented by disease or violence).

        Some object by saying human embryos are not human beings because they have the potential to become mature humans. The human embryo is unlike the sperm and ova (the sex cells), since the sex cells are manifestly not whole organisms. They are destined either to combine with an ovum or sperm or die. Even when they succeed in causing fertilization, they do not survive—their genetic material enters into the composition of a distinct, new organism. Moreover, human embryos should not be compared to somatic cells (e.g., skin cells, muscle cells), although some have tried to argue that they are. Similar to sex cells, a somatic cell is functionally only a part of a larger organism. On the other hand, from the beginning the human embryo has the internal resources and active disposition to develop himself or herself to full maturity. Therefore, what is killed in abortion is a human being, a whole living member of the species Homo sapiens, only at an earlier stage of development.

        Next, defenders of abortion hold that human being is distinguishable from person, and claim human beings are not yet persons. Accordingly, they believe it is wrong to kill persons, but not always wrong to kill human beings who are not persons. They proclaim that since embryos do not exercise higher mental capacities or have self-awareness, then they are not persons. However, human beings are living bodily entities—not consciousness that inhabits bodies. Sensation is a bodily action. Furthermore, the right to life is to have moral status, and this right would differ in some fundamental ways from other rights, such as the right to vote. It does not vary with place, circumstances, maturity, ability, and other factors. The right to life does not come and go with one’s location and situation. The right to life belongs to a human being at all times he or she exists, not at the certain stages of his or her existence. Human beings have the special kind of value that makes us subjects of rights in virtue or what we are, rather than in virtue of an attribute that we acquire after we have come to exist. Also, human embryos and fetuses also possess a capacity or potentiality for mental functions, although they cannot exercise these capacities. They are different than embryos of other biological species, which if not prevented by external forces, these mental capacities become exercisable. In sum, human beings are valuable as subjects of rights in virtue of what they are, which comes to be at conception.