Free Will: Problem and Solutions

Free Will: Problem and Solutions

The debate over the metaphysical problem of freedom is one of the oldest in philosophy. I believe that this problem can be reduced to one basic question: Do we have free will or are all of our actions determined? The answer to this question is relevant (and closely tied) to the concept of moral responsibility.

Firstly, when taking any position in the problem of free will, there are three statements that one must consider:

1. Our actions are causally determined.

2. If our actions are determined, then we cannot be morally responsible for them.

3. We have the freedom necessary to be morally responsible for our actions.

It is obvious that not all of these statements can coexist with each other. Any two of

them may be accepted, but the third must be rejected. Considering these three statements, there are three positions that one can take in the free will debate: determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Determinists accept statements 1 and 2, but reject statement 3. They agree with the thesis of universal causation, and hold that we are not morally responsible for our actions. Libertarianists accept statements 2 and 3 and reject statement 1. They argue that we do have metaphysical freedom, and while some events may be caused, not all of them are. Compatibilists accept statements 1 and 3 while rejecting statement 2. They say we are determined, but we are still free enough to be morally responsible for our actions.

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Being a compatibilist, W.T Stace believes in the existence of free will and in it's consistency with determinism. Stace begins by explaining that without the existence of free will, there could be no morality. Without any sense of morality, he continues, "no man could be held accountable for his actions" (p.481). Stace seems to find this lack of justification for punishment a very dangerous concept, and attempts to explain how the philosopher's improper definition of free will has forced it to become inconsistent with determinism.

Stace bases his argument on the idea that the entire dispute over the existence of free will is "due to nothing but a confusion over the meanings of words" (p.482). If someone were to believe that the word "man" referred to a five-legged animal and looking around observed no five-legged animals, he may feel confident in his denial of the existence of man (p.482). This, explains Stace, is common result when a term is given a definition that is not of common usage. In the