Next 100 Years

The book starts with brief Introduction to the American Age. During the 20th century, geopolitics changed every two decades: "when it comes to the future, the only thing we can be sure of is that common sense will be wrong." Presently, the dominance of the United States is the major geopolitical fact. "The U.S.-Islamist war is already ending and the next conflict is in sight," with Russia, not China. Later in the 21st century, Japan, Turkey, and Poland will emerge as world powers. As important as technological innovation will be "the end of the population explosion." The American Southwest will become "predominantly Mexican." The 21st century will not change "the permanent human condition," but "will be extraordinary in two senses: it will be the beginning of a new age, and it will see a new "global power astride the world."

Chapter one is related to the American dominance over the world. American power continues to dominate the world, with military power, especially naval, leading the way; the United States can "never be invaded". Through sea power and commerce, in 1500-2000 Europe came to dominate the world even as it tore itself apart internally. There are two different geopolitical views: Halford John Mackinder's "command the Heartland" view and Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's "control the sea" view; "both were right, in a sense," but Mahan's view proved more likely; "the Russians never had a chance." It is its ability to control sea lanes that makes North America "the center of gravity of the international system." But America "is in the earliest phase of its power and it is not fully civilized. America, like Europe in the sixteenth century, is still barbaric. Its culture is unformed", Cultures have three phases: barbarism (naïve belief in self), civilization (combination of belief and skepticism), and decadence (cynical disbelief).

Chapter two talks about The U.S.-Jihadist War. "The American Age began in December 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed." The U.S. has achieved the strategic goals in "the U.S.-jihadist war" of disrupting the Muslim world in the unstable "earthquake zone" stretching from SE Europe to Kazakhstan and Pakistan. Given that the U.S. "is, historically, a warlike country," from a wider perspective its response to 9/11 made "sense," despite its apparently "chaotic" and "random" character. "War is central to the American experience; it is built into American culture and deeply rooted in American culture." The U.S. has five geopolitical goals: "(1) to dominate North America with its army; (2) to eliminate any threat in the Western hemisphere; (3) to control maritime approaches to the U.S. with its navy; (4) to dominate the world's oceans; (5) to prevent any other nation from challenging its naval power." The Iraq and Afghan wars "were minor affairs" and "rhetoric aside, the United States has no overriding interest in peace in Eurasia." The international system is "badly out of balance"; no country can challenge the U.S., giving it "a huge margin of error." "The United States wins as long as al Qaeda loses."

In chapter three author talks about the changes in technology, culture which we will face in near future. The defense of the traditional family is ending. The population explosion will be coming to an end by 2100, thanks to birth control and the empowerment of women. "There is now a period built into life patterns where people are going to be sexually active but not yet able to support themselves financially. There is also a period in which they can support themselves and are sexually active, but choose not to reproduce. The entire pattern of traditional life is collapsing, and no clear alternative patterns are emerging yet, this trend cannot be reversed." The conservatism and traditionalism of blue- and pink-collar working classes can be explained from these trends. The computer is an example of American pragmatism, because English is "the language of computing," American culture is irresistible.

Chapter four " The New Fault Lines" talks about new global changes in certain geographical areas. Five areas have the potential for major disrupting geopolitical developments: the Pacific Basin, Russia, Europe, the Islamic world, and Mexico. Russia reversed its decline in Ukraine in early 2005 and is now extending its sphere of influence. The political unity of Europe is greatly exaggerated; Europe is "a collection of nation-states, still shell-shocked by World War II, the Cold War, and the loss of empire," in which Germany's position is "unpredictable." In