Piven and Cloward – Why Americans Still Don't Vote

Piven and Cloward – Why Americans Still Don't Vote

Despite being the first of the modern popular democratic states, the history of voting rights and voter turnout in the United States is nothing near as straightforward as one might think. From the dawn of the nation, the right to vote was limited to certain groups by law. Initially, being limited to property owning white males, gradually it was expanded to include unpropertied white men, black males after the civil war, and eventually grew to include women, as well. But while one would think with a growing number of people able to hit the polls, the percentage of voters would increase, throughout the early twentieth century, just the opposite was occurring. In their book "Why Americans Still Don't Vote: And Why Politicians Want It That Way," authors Frances F. Piven and Richard A. Cloward seek to explain the reasoning behind this modern democratic epidemic.

In chapter three of the book, Piven and Cloward describe the "Golden Era of American Democracy," which took place throughout the nineteenth century. They explain that during this time period, "[p]roperty qualifications that had restricted voting in the eighteenth century were steadily lowered," leading to a rise in the rates of voter participation (Piven 47). But this era of American politics would be short lived. With a growth in religious revival and an increase in immigration, these ethno-religious identifications would come to play a large role in the politics of the later portion of the century (Piven 49-50). In the cities, the nation would see the rise of ethnic gangs, clashing to control the polls and with them the politics of the region (Piven 50). Sectional and class identifications, oftentimes shaped by economic interests, when combined with the rapid expansion of voter participation would form the foundations of clientelism within political parties and prove to be a key factor in the development of party machines, such a Tammany Hall in new York City (Piven 50-53).

Even with all their corruption and graft, however, these party machines served the purpose of keeping urban, working-class citizens informed and organized within the political spectrum. They ensured that the lower classes were represented, but above all they were "producing peak participation rates of about 80 percent in the presidential elections of 1876, 1888, and 1896" (Piven 54). Economic changes spurred by the post-Civil War period would place the urban laborers, sometimes in combination with rural farmers, against the new owners of capital. The formation of the Populist movement would lead to a reaction by those with interests in big business and eventually would culminate in the election of 1896 and the downfall of the big city machines. After this election, the United States would see a trend forming in the decline of voter participation for years to come.

For a few years after the election, things were still looking good for those at discontent with American domestic policy, reaching its peak with the seeming success of the Progressive movement. But according to Piven and Cloward, "Progressivism ended, as voter turnout dropped to half the eligible electorate by World War I, and to far less of the working-class electorate" (69). Additionally, they claim that "[t]he domination of both parties by economic elites would have been less total were it