Tax Research and Bibliography

Tax Research and Bibliography

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Introduction

This paper addresses three aspects of corporate tax research and its associated bibliographies to clarify the subject matter, thus providing credence to the work and its authors.

Three subject have been explored; first examined was ‘equal opportunity and disabled workers’,

next was the deductibility of tuition, and finally, the matters of ‘tax court and TEFRA’ were

looked at and provided a nice grouping of responses over ten years.  

Research Results

Subject 1: Equal opportunity and disabled workers, returned one result in ten years.

Lytes v. DC water & sewer auth. No. 08-7002 936 (UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT  2005)

A (Appellant) former employee sought judicial review of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia's entry of summary judgment in favor of appellee, his former employer, on his claim that the employer refused to accommodate his disability and then terminated his employment, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and while the appeal was pending the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 became law. Only the district court's holding that the employee was not actually disabled was challenged and in applying the ADA prior to its amendment, the employee failed to discuss his functional capacity at the time of the alleged discrimination.  In fact, the employee never discussed or provided any proof to his employer at any time of his disability;  the court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Subject 2: deductibility of tuition, returned one result in ten years.

MICHAEL SKLAR; MARLA SKLAR, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee, No. No. 06-72961, LexisNexis  (UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 2008).

(Petitioner) Taxpayers claimed $ 15,000 in deductions for purported charitable contributions that the deduction was based on their estimate that 55% of the tuition payments were for purely religious education. The IRS disallowed the deduction. The IRS also determined the Sklars failed to meet the substantiation requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section 170(f)(8) with respect to the disallowed $ 15,000.00 of claimed charitable contributions.  The Orthodox Jewish school also prepared them for high school, thus 55% is a random number, and the school never purported to be of a charitable nature.  Deductions were disallowed.

Subject 3:  Tax court and TEFRA, returned ten results

American boat co. LLC v. united states, No. 09-1109 471 (UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE  SEVENTH CIRCUIT

To avoid the inefficiency associated with requiring the IRS to audit and adjust each partner's tax return, Congress created a unified partnership-level procedure for auditing and litigating partnership items, i.e., the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982, 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 6221-6234. The treatment of all partnership items should be determined at the partnership level and any non-partnership item is resolved during a partner-level proceeding/meeting. Prior to 1997, all penalties--even those relating to a partnership item--were assessed at the partner level. In 1997, as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act, , Congress amended TEFRA to provide that penalties related to adjustments of partnership items should also be determined during the partnership-level proceeding.

Transcapital leasing assocs., L.P. v. united states, 04-1172, 04-1173 1317 (UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) adds § 6226 to the Internal Revenue Code. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 and under TEFRA, each partnership designates a tax matters partner, who handles administrative issues and litigation for the partnership. If a tax matters partner does not file a petition in response to a final partnership administrative adjustments within the allotted statutory period, the notice partner may do so.  

The notice partner, with its principal place of business in San Antonio, Texas, filed an action on behalf of dissolved Virginia partnerships against the United States to challenge FPAAs. The district court transferred the action to the court of federal claims. On appeal, the court reversed the order and the court held that the district court did not properly construe in determining an additional jurisdictional requirement on persons wishing to challenge FPAAs. The court held that the "principal place of business" language in § 6226(a)(2) was a venue provision and that such interpretation was consistent with the legislative history, the provision's context within TEFRA, and case law.