The My Lai Massacre

The My Lai Massacre

Most cannot imagine what it would be like to be a soldier in the Vietnam War. There is no doubt that what happened in My Lai was an atrocity beyond measures. On March 16, 1968, in the village of My Lai, U.S. soldiers committed vicious and unthinkable acts of violence on innocent Vietnamese civilians. In only four hours, U.S. soldiers had burned villages, destroyed crops, and brutally tortured and/or murdered any where from three to five-hundred men, women, and children. After the news of the My Lai massacre broke, some Americans opposing the war went as far as to label U.S. soldiers that fought in the Vietnam War as baby killers. The reality is no one really knows unless he or she has actually been in that situation. What would cause human beings to commit such violent acts on other human beings? This question is not one that is easily answered. Due to the important lessons we can learn, this question deserves careful research and evaluation. It is also important to consider events that occurred prior to the actual incident. There was inaccurate information given to the platoon leaders and confusion surrounded the orders that were to be followed. This led the soldiers to believe that killing everything had been authorized.

Army intelligence had given inaccurate information that had gone through several chains before ultimately reaching Second Lt Calley and his troops. As a college course textbook describes, though no orders were documented, the "search-and-destroy mission" was directed by Lt. Col. Barker. On March 15, the day before the incident, Barker's superior had briefed him and other officers on the lack of aggressiveness on the part of previous units at My Lai. Later that day, Barker held briefings with Capt. Ernest Medina and other staff members. Barker insisted that no one would be in the village but Viet Cong and that all civilians would be at the market (Kelman and Hamilton 27). According to Second Lt. Calley, Medina spoke to the troops about the raid on My Lai that would take place on the following day: "We're going after the 48th battalion. And they outnumber us two to one. At least, and there will be heavy casualties tomorrow" (Sack 88). The lack of aggressiveness resulted in Alpha and Bravo being attached from behind, meaning they had not cleared out the enemy before moving on. Civilians were also known to have participated in fighting along with VC troops (Sack 88). By now, fear and anxiety had set in and the troops were mentally preparing for the following day.

Though the orders were not documented, Kelman points out that a military criminal investigation report concluded that the orders given were left open to interpretation. The report indicated that orders caused confusion and expectations of the mission were unclear. The order was described as a "search-and-destroy mission". Also noted during the military investigation were inconsistencies on whether or not the order was to destroy everything including women and children. Though civilians were not supposed to be in the target area, there were no specific instructions regarding what to do if there were. What to do with civilians was determined by the soldier's interpretation of superior orders and expectations. The testimonies of staff members at the briefing are inconsistent, there were overwhelming indications that the destruction of livestock, crops, houses, and any other types of shelter was either ordered or suggested. The investigation report concluded that Barker's inadequate instructions on dealing with civilians had left his directions open to interpretation, and that some could have understood his orders to mean "…authority to open fire, without restriction, on all persons found in target area" (Kelman and Hamilton 27). Calley believed that the order was clear:

"Medina said, as I remember it. "Alpha and Bravo got messed up because they let the VC get behind them. And took heavy casualties and lost their momentum, and it was their downfall. Our job," Medina said, "is to go in rapidly and to neutralize everything. To kill everything." [anonymous questioner] "Captain Medina? Do you mean women and children too?" [Medina answered] "I mean everything" (Sack 89).

To identify how the authorization process was a major factor in the My Lai massacre, one must first understand how the authorization process works. One example is an experiment formulated by a Yale psychologist named Stanley Milgram in 1961 who was hoping to discover what might cause obedience to orders to override a moral conscience. Milgram's experiment included volunteers that believed they were participating in the research of learning and memory. Instead, they were being observed while Milgram and his group studied