The Soviets and U.S. from 1945 onwards:
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When thinking about and analyzing the idea of Soviet Russia and the United States’ views on ‘world domination’ and the possible achievement of such, one must first take many things into consideration. The first and foremost would be to observe and think critically about the worldwide political landscape in the years following World War II (1945 onwards). This time in history (and leading all the way through the Cold War) can be seen as a period of intense ideological polarization across the globe. Obviously there were supporters of the two rival camps expressing hope that their ideology would emerge triumphant over the other and become the pre-eminent form of government worldwide. Elements within the allied blocs led by the Soviet Union and the United States accused each other of having objectives of global domination.When looking at the situation through the lens of time, it is much easier to garner an intelligent and un-biased opinion on the matter than it would have been during the era which it took place. Through the duration of the nuclear arms’ races and throught the Cold War, people on each side of the line believed the other was aiming towards world domination in one form or the other. With the help of history, we can now explore whether or not such ideas were founded on fact, or merely propaganda and fear mongering. All in all though, it comes down to the idea of ‘world domination’ and how it is understood differently in the social and political worlds. If you do not think about ‘world domination’ in the Alexanderian or Napoleonic sense, but rather a global hegemonic sense; then yes the Soviet Union (and on the other side of the same coin, the U.S.) were aiming towards world domination during the arms races’ taking place from 1945 onwards.
The Soviet Union in pursuit of its objective of world hegemony during the last half of the twentieth century, not only accepted the premise that military warfare was inevitable and essential, but continued to orient each and every policy and action toward a constant increase of total Soviet military potential. There was no doubt that the advent of Soviet atomic capability would result in a sharp increase in Soviet total power. When talking about this power though, were are not saying that the Soviets possessing a sizable stockpile of atomic weapons would necessarily equal the Soviets attacking the United States and its Allies by direct military action. This was always certainly on the forefront of the political landscape of the time though. When thinking about the employment of military force by the Soviets though, one must take into consideration other Soviet strategic forces already engaged directly, as well as the status of Soviet-controlled areas and peoples. Therefore, at the time, any approximation of estimation of military action; or even guesses about probable Soviet concepts for achieving objectives, or strategy depended solely on Soviet estimates of the situation. In the eyes of many people at the time, the Soviets were continuing to try and stir up mass opinion in the West for disarmament and against the use of atomic weapons in the event of war. In this way, they hoped to create sufficient public pressure on the Western governments to neutralize the United States bomb.
Thinking about the idea of the atomic bomb and nuclear warfare in general being essential in talks about these pursuits of ‘world domination’ are somewhat off though. In reality, the elimination of the atomic bomb as a weapon of war would have been militarily advantageous to the U.S.S.R. (except with respect to a direct Soviet attack upon the United States.) While outlawing of the bomb might have been militarily advantageous to the USSR, in terms of operations in Europe or Asia, the USSR most likely gambled on the political and psychological advantage of retaining the threat of atomic, and thus military advantages, of excluding it. In essence, the Soviets believed that when they acquired what they considered an adequate stockpile of bombs, the capabilities for employing threats and intimidation in an effect to detach individual states from the Western bloc would be considerably increased. This train of thought and action (the continued stockpiling of bombs by the USSR and also the United States) created Soviet atomic capabilities which then in turn had obvious military implications for the security of the United States.
After such strides in military achievement, the Soviet’s military potential was then placed in an increased position relative to that of the United States. The Continental U.S. would now have fears of, for the first time, being vulnerable to serious damage from air and guided missile attack. The United States losing their monopoly on the nuclear market certainly reduced the effectiveness both militarily and psychologically of the Atlantic Pact. The United States had lost its capability